The Cosmic Designer

Having written The Cosmic Design and the Designer to explore what modern science can say about the nature of our universe and reality, I’ve been wondering what it might be possible to tell about the Designer: did it have an origin, where did it come from, what is it like? The first two questions seem, on the face of it anyway, truly unknowable. They eventually reach the point of whether it’s turtles all the way down. But the question of what the Designer might be like, how it might be described, is perhaps open to some exploration.

Considering the nature of the Designer depends on the questions we ask. We might start by asking if, from our perspective, the Designer did a good job or a bad one? Given the state of the world we live in at the dawn of the 21^st Century, you could go either way.

Or we might begin by considering whether humans are in the Designer’s image. (Humans have long imagined their gods in their own image, but somehow greater.) At our best, we are conscious, rational individuals with free will and the capacity to act with the moral sense of right and wrong, good and bad. At our worst, we are killers who shit in our our nest and do not always even eat what we kill. In between, we are weak souls often unable to perceive and understand our own self-interest. The cosmic design allows our best form, so perhaps the Designer is also a rational agent with free will, one that defines, by its own nature, the good. I’ll go with that.

Freud’s work on the healthy soul and Alastair McIntyre on individual practical reasoners can help us describe the rational agent. According to Freud, the psychically healthy individual is one where our I (das Ich) has absorbed the It (das Es) and the Over-I (das Uberich). The I holds the soul's facility of intellect and reason. In Freud's conception, psychic health is attaining the proper internal order, one where the I overcomes and absorbs the Over-I (the imposed internal agent of outside authority) and the It (the drives and desires of our animal and infantile self). Thus freed, the individual becomes capable of choosing and acting in a rational and practical manner, following our own defined ends and goals, within the confines of what reality presents. McIntyre looks to moral virtue (aretḗ) as elaborated by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Human beings are animals, they begin as such and remain as such with the bodily desires and needs of all animals. We possess the intelligence common to other animals such as the dolphins and our fellow great apes. But with language we can move beyond this to become independent practical reasoners (Freud’s healthy soul) following the necessary reciprocal obligations of giving and receiving (the virtues) that allow us as social animals to collectively live the good life.

Free will manifests as choice. Choice – the ability to choose and the act of choosing (as confined only by the laws of nature) – expresses free will. How does choice get made? Through individual consciousness. Consciousness allows choice and is a property of an individual agency, a being. Free will is an expression of an individual consciousness operating in a universe that permits the ability to choose between different achievable outcomes. Consciousness powers the will.

Consciousness – in the human at least – rides a wave generated by individual, biologically-based processes running through and on our “wetware” of neurons and neural networks with inputs from our bodily organs, processes and senses. These processes produce what might be termed native intelligence (as opposed to artificial intelligence) one that comes about through the biological equivalent of “machine learning” and probably includes quantum computing elements and entangled states. When the brain and neural networks of higher animals – great apes, dolphins and others – became complex enough to support quantum processing, that may have been the point at which consciousness is kickstarted into self-consciousness.

Humans are self-conscious creatures capable of reasoning and choice and, thus, also of acting morally. If we are in the image of the Designer, it must be also. The Designer included free will in the design because it enjoys free will and values it. Of course, who really knows and how could we tell? One might suppose our apparently designed universe was a random creation out of nothing, simply an accident (one of an infinite variety of random big bangs). Or perhaps it’s some form of “simulation” (as a higher dimensional form of entertainment?). But as I have argued before, these beg the questions of how and why there should be anything rather than nothing. If there was a design – and following St. Thomas’ finger – the Designer had to be an individual, conscious being.

Notes on "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 28

For episode 27, see here

The Theory of the Nation State: The Moderns

XXVIII. Hegel: Dialectic and Nationalism
 A. The typical conclusions of the Enlightenment:
       1. Hume showed ambiguities of "reason."
       2. Rousseau set up reasons of the heart (sentiment) against reasons
           of the head.
       3. Immanuel Kant sharpened contrast of science and morals (and between
           theoretical and practical reason) to preserve both.
       4. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel sought unifying synthesis through
           transcending analytic logic of science. 
 B. Hegel proposed dialectic to demonstrate logical relationship between
      fact and value.
 C. Revolution seen by many, including Hegel, as destructive, doctrinaire
      attempt to remake society and human nature.
       1. Therefore necessity of reconstruction of continuity of national
           institutions.
       2. But was to be reconstruction of stability by the creative forces
           of the nation.
 D. The nation, not the individual, is the significant unit of history via the 
      genius or spirit of the nation -- Volksgeist.
 E. Hegel's political philosophy built around the dialectic and the theory
      of the nation state as the embodiment of political power.  (These two
      did not necessarily entail each other.)
 F. The historical method:
       1. Method of studying history also could be applicable to other
           social studies.
       2. Mode of deriving from the order of historical events standards
           of valuation with which to access significance of particular
           stages in evolution (a philosophy of history).   
       3. Assumed single pattern or law of development that can be 
           exhibited by a proper arrangement of subject matter.
       4. Order is not imposed but immanent.
       5. Standards progressively revealed in evolution of morals, 
           law, etc., provides historically objective standard of values
           to fill vacant place of natural law.
        6. Hegel sought to show necessary stages by which reason 
           approximates the Absolute.
       7. Understanding and reason were faculties of analysis and 
           synthesis respectively and dialectic unites the two.
       8. Understand "breaks up" organic wholes, it is the philosophic 
           basis of indivualism.
           i. fosters illusion that men can remake society
           ii. misses organic creative continuous growth
       9. Only reason can see below historical detail to perceive forces
           that really control events and thus understand that the process
           should be as it is.
 G. In study of religion, following Herder and Lessing, saw succession of
      world religions as progressive revelation of religious truth.
 H. Thought Western civilization product of Greek free intelligence and
      deeper moral and religious insights of Christianity.
 I.  The process of development of the spirit of a people:
       1. Period of "natural" happy but largely unconscious spontaneity
           (thesis).
       2. Period of painful frustration and self-consciousness in which
           the spirit is "turned inward" and loses its spontaneous 
           creativeness (antithesis).
       3. Period in which spirit " returns to itself" at a higher level
           embodying insight gained from frustration (synthesis).
       4. The total process is "thought."
 J. Hegel saw freedom as existing only within bounds of a nation state.
       1. The state is the expression (de facto power) of national unity and
           a national aspiration to self-government.
       2. The state is consistent with any lack of uniformity which does not
           prevent effectively unified government (such as class differences).
       3. With Machiavelli saw no higher duty for the state than its own 
           strengthening and preservation.
       4. The state is the realm in which the Idea of Reason materializes 
           itself (The German Constitution, 1802).
 K. Realization of national spirit contributes to progressive realization of
      the world spirit and is the source of dignity and worth that attaches
      to private concerns of individuals. 
       1. Freedom is voluntary dedication to that realization.
       2. National monarchy is the highest form of constitutional government.
 L. Dialectic and historical necessity (The Philosophy of Right, 1821). 
       1. Dialectic is the new method.
       2. History of a people records the growth of a single national
           mentality that expresses itself in all phases of its culture.

"The individual is for the most part only an accidental variant of the culture
  that created him and insofar as he is different his individuality is more
  likely to be capricious than signficant."

       3. Dialectic is the opposition of forces moving in orderly equilibrium
           and emerging in a pattern of progressive, logical development.
       4. Contradiction means fruitful opposition between systems that 
           constitutes an objective criticism of each and leads continually to
           a more inclusive and coherent system. (Dialectic could manifest as 
           evolution or revolution.) 
 M. Hegel claimed dialectic as logic of reason to supersede logic of
       understanding.
       1. Dialectic both moral judgement and causal law of historical
           development.
       2. Unites relativism with the absolutism.
 N. Dialectic offered no criterion of rightness except success of outcome.
 O. Hegel: individualism and theory of the state.
       1. Individualism had no hold in Hegel's Germany and the same with
           sense of national unity.
       2. Hegel's Philosophy of Right deals with the relationships between
           individual and the social and economic institutions.
       3. Placed state as on a level of political evolution above civil
           society (the result of the end of feudal law and institutions).
       4. Revolution's ideals of liberty and equality made state a mere 
           matter of private interest, a utilitarian device for satisfying private
           needs elevating abstract individualism over society and state.
       5. The individual's best interest lies in being a member of society and 
           the state.
       6. Individualism indifferent to moral and spiritual development of 
           personality by falsifying the nature of social institutions through
           regarding them only as accidental and mere utilitarian devices to 
           satisfy irrational needs
       7. Hegel shared the "Greek notion" of citizenship not in terms of private
           rights but of social functions. 
 P. Hegel saw individual motives as capricious and sentimental, with civil
     civil society as a realm of mechanical necessity, a result of irrational 
     forces of a society.
       1. Society, apart from the state, is governed by non-moral causal laws
           and hence ethically anarchical.
       2. Only the state embodied ethical values and ought therefore to be
           absolute.
       3. Individual attains moral dignity only as he devotes himself to
           the state.
       4. Hegel's theory of freedom implied nothing definite in the way of
           civil or political liberties but he did not reject them in practice. 
       5. The state depends on civil society as the means of accomplishing
            the moral purpose it embodies.
       6. The state is absolute but not arbitrary, it must rule through law and
           law is "rational."
       7. Civil society consists of corporations and the legislature is where
           they meet the state.
       8. The legislature only advisory to the ministry of the governing class
           or "universal class."
 Q. Hegel's constitutionalism not liberal (i.e., democratic procedures)
      but based on orderly bureaucratic administration not subject to
      to public opinion but to the public spirit of an official class that
      stands above conflicts of economic and social interests.
 R. Hegel united Rousseau's general will (the manifestation of the 
      spiritual force forming the core of reality) and Burke's religious
      vision of history as a "divine tactic." 
 S. Replaced eternal system of unchangeable natural law with a
      rational unfolding of the Absolute in History.
       1. Reason manifested itself in social groups not individuals.
       2. Society seen as system of forces rather than community of 
           individuals.
       3. Highlighted importance of historical study of institutions but
           left individual actions as merely a "reflection" of social forces.
       4. Can be seen as giving rise to Marxism (a direct link), the English
           liberalism of Oxford idealists and the Italian fascists. 

Next week:  Liberalism -- Philosophical Radicalism
 
 
 

Notes on "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 27

For episode 26, see here

The Theory of the Nation State: The Moderns

XXVII. Convention and Tradition -- Hume and Burke
 A. Natural Law hung on in France as revolutionary solvent of an antiquated
      system.
 B. In defense of revolution in England, natural law had no immediate 
     practical utility.
       1. Idea of deductive ethics and philosophy slowly rejected.
       2. Empirical philosophy stressing natural history of ideas and their
           derivation from the senses developed (as Locke suggested).
 C. David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, 1739-40)  
       1. Presented analysis that exposed pretensions of natural law to
           scientific validity.
       2. Use of reason had uncritically combined and confused three factors.
           i. Had effect of describing as necessary truths propositions that can
              make no such claim.
           ii. Can be things rightly called reasonable in the sense of being
               necessary and inevitable, e.g., formal implications where a
               conclusion follows if a premise is taken for granted--> deduction. (1)
           iii. No "comparison of ideas" can prove a matter of fact, and 
               relationships between matters of fact are never necessary in a strict
               sense but simply empirically correlated.(2)
           iv. Reason cannot dictate ways of acting, good or bad but can only
               guide us to know how to achieve desired ends and how to avoid 
               undesired ones.(3)

 Hume: "reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can
 never pretend to any other office than to save and obey them."

       3. The attacked the three branches of natural law system.
           i. Natural or rational religion -- a rational metaphysics showing the
              necessary existence of anything -- is impossible.
           ii. Rational ethics also since values depend on human propensity
               to action and reason cannot itself create any obligation. 
               Virtue is just a quality of mind that is generally approved. 
           iii. Contractual, consensual theories of politics also as government
                doesn't really ask subjects to consent. Loyalty towards
                government is as common as feeling that agreements should
                be kept; purposes of political allegiance is to keep order and
                preserve peace and security while contract creates mutual trust
                between private persons.  Both are binding because stable
                society is not possible without them.
       4. Hume didn't find man to be as calculating of his self interest as
           did Bentham and the French utilitarians.
       5. Common interest exists as body of conventions shown by experience
           to serve human needs in a general way.  Rules provide stability as
           men need to know what they can rely on:
           i. Conventions regulating property --> justice
           ii. Those that legitimate political authority 
           iii. Utility includes self interest and social stability
 D. Hume's conclusions largely accepted but branded as merely negative.
       1. Logical result was empirical positivism.
       2. Metaphysics, religion and ethics went on, however, in more or less
           traditional forms.
           i. Kant and Hegel attempted to reunite reason, fact and value
           ii. tendency to either depreciate logic as compared to sentiment or
               to hope to combine the two (Carlyle)
           iii. respect for sentiment led to new estimate of custom and tradition,
               as unfolding of reason rather than its antithesis (Burke)
           iv. view of history as gradual unfolding of the absolute 
 E. Edmund Burke accepted Hume and saw a society's standards as
      conventions based on propensities.
       1. Saw conventions as repository of achievements of the species.
       2. Saw society and propensities as human nature.
       3. Consequently, traditions of a nation's life have utility above their
           contribution to individual utility.
       4. Therefore, tradition of constitution, and of society at large, ought to be
           object of almost religious reverence.
       5. The species is wiser that the individual or any movement.
       6. Supported Whigs because the particular outcome of the English
           revolution they represented was by that time tradition. 
           i. Consequently, his theory of representation looked back to the
              17th Century
           ii. Denied representation being of individuals or territories
           iii. Parliament was meeting place of dominant interests where they
               could be held accountable
           iv. did, however, see positive benefits of parties as groups of men
               pursuing their natural interests upon some shared principle.
       7. A people was a "true politic personality" -- a community held together
           by sense of membership and duty and not calculated self interest.
       8. Man could not live on private stock of reason.
       9. Statesman consulted spirit of the constitution to gain clues for its
           development; statesmanship is an art. 
       10. Rejected French Revolution as destruction of society through
             destruction of government.
           i. For Sabine, Burke confused state, government and society by
              interchanging them.
           ii. Resulted in transferring reverence toward society to reverence
               to the state.
           iii. Practically made politics religion and saw unfolding immanence
               of God.
       11. Rousseau and Burke shared reverence for community.
       12. Hegel systematized Burke, though no direct link.

Next week: Hegel -- Dialectic and Nationalism




   
  

Notes on "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 25

For episode 24, see here

The Theory of the Nation State

XXV. France: The Decadence of Natural Law
 A. English consolidated their revolution and political theory
      shifted to France.
 B. French concern for political and social theory resulted from
      decadence of royal absolute rule.
 C. Discussion typically popularized rather than created.
 D. Tendencies
       1. Mixture of logically incompatible ethical and political
           utilitarianism with natural right theories.
       2. Growth of philosophical romanticism hostile to
           empiricism and rationalism.
 E. Rousseau untypical of 18th Century French thought.
 F. Through Voltaire and Montesquieu philosophy of Locke
      became foundation of French Enlightenment. 
       1. Reason, tied to tradition in English thought, was placed
           in opposition to custom and fact in France.
       2. No fundamental law or gradual transition of ideas or
           institutions in absolutist France. 
       3. French political thought thus radical and often little
           more than propaganda.
 G. Urban middle class was conscious of itself and saw clergy
       nobility as social parasites.
 H. Characteristic of social thought of 18th Century was belief
      in possibility of happiness and progress guided by reason.
 I. Montesquieu (Spirit of the Laws, 1748) 
       1. Undertook sociological theory of government and law
           by showing they depended upon circumstances in
           which a people lives.
       2. Also analyzed constitutional conditions of freedom.
       3. Saw "reason" as manifesting itself through different
           institutions in different environments.
       4. Saw separation of powers (in England) as prime 
           guarantee of liberty.
       5. Made separation one of the legal checks and balances
           between parts of the constitution.
           i. Didn't specify the parts
           ii. But did assume some form of legislative supremacy
 J. Voltaire
       1. Sought to popularize Newton's physics and Locke's
           philosophy.
       2. Especially admired England's freedom of discussion 
           and publication.
       3. Pressed struggle for civil liberties but did not connect 
           that to a basis in political liberty.
 K. Helvetius
       1. Presented an elaboration of Locke's psychological of
           association (Pain and pleasure as basic motives).
       2. Made it basis for the reforming legislator and conveyed
           greatest happiness principle to Beccaria and Bentham.
       3. Legislator must make general interest consonant with
           individual interest and spread knowledge of how public
           welfare includes that of the indivudual.
       4. Notion that everyone's happiness could be maximized
           at once was nothing but old belief in harmony of nature. 
       5. Belief that one man's happiness ought to be counted as
           the same as that of another based on natural equality.
       6. Using pleasure and pain could in fact lead to harmonizing 
           interests through focus on utility.
 L. Physiocrats (economists)
       1. Regarded pleasure and pain as two springs of human action
           and enlightened self-interest as rule for a well-ordered
           society.  
       2. Assumed harmony would result if man was let alone.
       3. No legislator should regulate, must instead not interfere 
           with natural operation of economic laws. 
 M. Holbach
       1. Made atheist, or materialist, attack on religion.
       2. Also attacked government as representative of parasitic
           classes excluding the middle class whose special interest
           defined the general interest as well.
       3. Man was not born bad but made bad by bad government.
       4. Remedy was to give free scope to the "general will" arising
           from the harmony between self-interest and natural good.
       5. Education would reform man because men are rational and 
           need only to see their own true interest.
 N. Enlightenment thought did not necessarily lead to democratic 
      doctrine; power still based on property. 
 O. Turgot and Condorcet turned idea of progress into a
       philosophy of history.
       1. Saw history as series of progressive stages.
       2. Condorcet saw progress following three lines:
           i. growing equality between nations
           ii. elimination of class differences
           iii. a resultant general moral and mental improvement

Next week:  Rousseau and the rediscovery of community
          
           
      
           
 
 

  
         

Notes on "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 20

For episode 19, see here

The Theory of the Nation State

XX. England: Preparation for Civil War
 A. Lines between rival political ideas not clearly drawn in early 17th Century
      England.
       1. No need to support royal absolutism with the theory of divine right.
       2. None had to seek theoretical defense for right to resist.
 B. Thomas Moore's Utopia (1516) was political satire expressing dislike of 
      growing acquisitive society.
       1. Harked back to Platonic conception of community of cooperative
           classes.
       2. Illustrated "looking back" from coming economic age.
 C. Richard Hooker argued that Puritan refusal of obedience to establish church
      was denying all political obligation.
       1. Reason was accepted universally as soon as it was understood.
       2. Law of reason was manifestly binding on all men.
       3. Man cannot satisfy all their needs in isolation and therefore form society.
       4. Ground of political obligation is common consent by which men agreed
           to be ordered by someone.
       5. Society could never withdraw its consent to authority it has set up after
           the fact.
       6. Ecclesiastical law of England not contrary to Christian faith and therefore
           binding -- as was all law -- upon all Englishmen.
 D. Calvinists and Catholics objected to royal supremacy in the Church as an 
      invasion of it's spiritual independence.
 E. Independents split church from state, seeing the former as a voluntary
     association.
 F. Erastianism of John Seldon saw the relationship between religion and the
     king in utilitarian, secularist and rational terms not common or typical
     for times.
 G. King, courts and Parliament each seen as having inherent powers, none
      claimed supremacy until the civil war.
 H. First conflict between king and courts over royal prerogative.
       1. Francis Bacon defended the right of the King to overrule the courts.
       2. Chief Justice Edward Coke argued for supremacy of common law over
           the King and Parliament.
      3. Coke saw law as indigenous growth within the realm that defined all
          rights and obligations.

Next week:  Thomas Hobbes