The Cosmic Designer

Having written The Cosmic Design and the Designer to explore what modern science can say about the nature of our universe and reality, I’ve been wondering what it might be possible to tell about the Designer: did it have an origin, where did it come from, what is it like? The first two questions seem, on the face of it anyway, truly unknowable. They eventually reach the point of whether it’s turtles all the way down. But the question of what the Designer might be like, how it might be described, is perhaps open to some exploration.

Considering the nature of the Designer depends on the questions we ask. We might start by asking if, from our perspective, the Designer did a good job or a bad one? Given the state of the world we live in at the dawn of the 21^st Century, you could go either way.

Or we might begin by considering whether humans are in the Designer’s image. (Humans have long imagined their gods in their own image, but somehow greater.) At our best, we are conscious, rational individuals with free will and the capacity to act with the moral sense of right and wrong, good and bad. At our worst, we are killers who shit in our our nest and do not always even eat what we kill. In between, we are weak souls often unable to perceive and understand our own self-interest. The cosmic design allows our best form, so perhaps the Designer is also a rational agent with free will, one that defines, by its own nature, the good. I’ll go with that.

Freud’s work on the healthy soul and Alastair McIntyre on individual practical reasoners can help us describe the rational agent. According to Freud, the psychically healthy individual is one where our I (das Ich) has absorbed the It (das Es) and the Over-I (das Uberich). The I holds the soul's facility of intellect and reason. In Freud's conception, psychic health is attaining the proper internal order, one where the I overcomes and absorbs the Over-I (the imposed internal agent of outside authority) and the It (the drives and desires of our animal and infantile self). Thus freed, the individual becomes capable of choosing and acting in a rational and practical manner, following our own defined ends and goals, within the confines of what reality presents. McIntyre looks to moral virtue (aretḗ) as elaborated by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Human beings are animals, they begin as such and remain as such with the bodily desires and needs of all animals. We possess the intelligence common to other animals such as the dolphins and our fellow great apes. But with language we can move beyond this to become independent practical reasoners (Freud’s healthy soul) following the necessary reciprocal obligations of giving and receiving (the virtues) that allow us as social animals to collectively live the good life.

Free will manifests as choice. Choice – the ability to choose and the act of choosing (as confined only by the laws of nature) – expresses free will. How does choice get made? Through individual consciousness. Consciousness allows choice and is a property of an individual agency, a being. Free will is an expression of an individual consciousness operating in a universe that permits the ability to choose between different achievable outcomes. Consciousness powers the will.

Consciousness – in the human at least – rides a wave generated by individual, biologically-based processes running through and on our “wetware” of neurons and neural networks with inputs from our bodily organs, processes and senses. These processes produce what might be termed native intelligence (as opposed to artificial intelligence) one that comes about through the biological equivalent of “machine learning” and probably includes quantum computing elements and entangled states. When the brain and neural networks of higher animals – great apes, dolphins and others – became complex enough to support quantum processing, that may have been the point at which consciousness is kickstarted into self-consciousness.

Humans are self-conscious creatures capable of reasoning and choice and, thus, also of acting morally. If we are in the image of the Designer, it must be also. The Designer included free will in the design because it enjoys free will and values it. Of course, who really knows and how could we tell? One might suppose our apparently designed universe was a random creation out of nothing, simply an accident (one of an infinite variety of random big bangs). Or perhaps it’s some form of “simulation” (as a higher dimensional form of entertainment?). But as I have argued before, these beg the questions of how and why there should be anything rather than nothing. If there was a design – and following St. Thomas’ finger – the Designer had to be an individual, conscious being.

Language, Hunting and Bezos

Language makes us human and different from all other of earth's creatures. With it, we can think, plan and act. Other animals communicate with each other through various means (bees do it through dance). But only we have words and grammars, with which we can great structures of meaning. With language comes society, culture, science, technology, and history.

But from whence comes language? Perhaps from group hunting. Social carnivores such as wolves and lions do not have language but still coordinate hunting. Between early learning – cubs practicing innate skills and watching adults – and basic vocalizations, they can surround prey and attack in unison. Some whales coordinate their approach to circle their prey and drive them into a concentration that allows a dense feeding ball. But these creatures come with their weapons built in, fangs, teeth and claws or huge mouths.

Primitive humans did not have built-in weapons or thick hides. Out on the savanna, they were easy prey for other carnivores and would be poor hunters against anything big enough to satisfy the group’s hunger. They needed to make artificial weapons and, working together, use them to kill their prey.

At some point in human evolution, some series of chance mutations increased the brain’s capacity to process and organize information sufficiently enough to move beyond simple grunts and other calls towards a structured use of vocalizations. This would have provided a huge evolutionary advantage. Humans could begin to coordinate more elaborate approaches to prey animals.

Language – as it became more elaborate – would serve many other purposes, such as passing on learning about making weapons and which plants were good to eat and where to find them. But it may have been most useful at first in hunting. Homo sapiens even hunted the huge mammoths into extinction. The first leaders in human society may have been those most capable of using language to coordinate hunting.

Language allows the possibility of free-flowing thought. With words and grammar, individuals can recall the past, examine the present, probe accumulated human experience, and imagine a future to be pursued to advantage. Throughout human history, those that do this best made the best “hunters” and captured the biggest “prey.” They drove human development by finding new ways to exploit others and the found environment. As society superseded family, they also thought of monopolizing what they “captured” to turn temporary advantage into permanent advantage. Great war leaders might seek to become kings, great inventors owners of ever expanding conglomerates. Jeff Bezos seeks to own the core exchange mechanism of 21^st Century economy.

The drive to seek and maintain profit has provided a positive dynamic in human civilization. We cannot and should not seek to prevent the hunters from seeking new prey. Bezos and Amazon clearly show the advantages of the e-approach to economic exchange and it has become very useful during the current COVID-19 crisis. Bezos has even prodded old line hunters like Walmart into more effective ways. But allowing the best hunters free reign only works for the group when they share the meat.

A number of “tech giants” have now become the focus of attention for their efforts to monopolize their hunting style and for using it mostly for their own gain. It is reasonable for the rest of us – who also do our part to maintain the social and economic order – to look to limiting their ability to seek only self-enrichment. This doesn’t mean doing away with successful hunters – even if we could – but helping them share better through truly progressive taxation, less exploitative practices and perhaps breaking up their enterprises to create room for more hunters.

Continuing Notes on Sabine's "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 30

For episode 29, see here

The Theory of the Nation State: The moderns

XXX. Liberalism Modernized
 A. "Collectivism" as a spontaneous defense against social
     destructiveness of industrial revolution began to replace
     economic liberalism.
 B. Liberal theory had to meet realities of industrialization.  
 C. John Stuart Mill on Liberty
         1. Mill's philosophy, in a broad sense, is an effort to modify
           the empiricism in which he was bred by taking into
           account Kantian philosophy.
       2. Granted differing degrees of pleasure in moral qualities,
           thus departing from greatest happiness standard.
       3. Abandoned egoism and saw moral goods as good in
           themselves apart from contribution to greatest good.
       4. Argued for popular government and liberty not as merely
           efficient means but as producing and giving scope to a
           a high moral character.
       5. Saw that behind liberal government there must be a 
           liberal society.
       6. But while arguing for individual freedom, the area for such
           freedom -- must have no effect on others -- is reduced to
           insignificance.
       7. Mill never clarified what the individual ought to decide for
           himself and could not appeal to a notion of natural rights.
       8. Abandoned laissez faire in economics.
       9. Mill's liberalism:
           i. added respect for human beings to utility
           ii. accepted political and social freedom as good in themselves
           iii. liberty is a social good as well as an individual good
           iv. the function of a liberal state in a free society is positive
               not negative
 D. Mill saw that Bentham had neglected role that institutions play
     between individual psychology and concrete elements of given
     time and place and did not recognize historical development.
 E. Auguste Comte hoped to make concept of society not speculation
     but science. 
       1. Proposed existence of general law of "development" of
           societies.
       2. The "comparative method" of examining societies became
           "science".
 F. Mill tried to incorporate Comte into utilitarian tradition enlarging
     "empirical" from basis in individual psychology to include the
     study of social institutions and especially their growth.
 G. Herbert Spencer
       1. Also came from philosophical radicalism tradition.
       2. Blended utilitarianism ethical and political ideas with the
           new conception of organic evolution.
       3. While Mill went back to Bentham's empiricism, Spencer
           went back to rationalist tradition of classical economics
           using evolution to reconstruct system of natural society
           with natural boundaries between economics and politics.
       4. In his Synthetic Philosophy, he tried to set up a rationalistic
           system spanning whole range of human knowledge with
           progression from energy to life, from life to mind, from mind
           to society, from society to ever more complex civilizations. 
       5. Saw moral improvement of social well-being achieved through
           the survival of the fittest. 
       6. The state would wither away as society grew more complex 
           through an extension of laissez faire.
       7. Legislation mars this move towards perfection that nature
           itself tends toward via survival of the fittest.
 H. In response to the growing claim of labor to more than subsistence
     existence, and public support for this claim, liberalism needed
     revision to give positive role to government.
 I. Oxford idealists -- T.H.Green, Josiah Royce and John Dewey --
     provided this revision in the late 19th Century.
       1.With Hegel, they shared the general idea that human nature
           is fundamentally social.
       2. Brought to liberalism the problem of the mutual dependence
           between the structure of personality and the cultural
           structure of its social milieu. 
       3. Green saw deprivation as not only economic but also moral.
           i. with the Greeks, saw politics as essentially an agency
              for creating social conditions that make moral
              developmemt possible.
           ii. posited concept of positive freedom to enjoy something
              worth doing or enjoying -- as opposed to Bentham's
              negative freedom from legal restraint -- as freedom must
              include actual possibility of developing human capacities
           iii. requires a genuinely increased individual ability to
               share in goods produced by society and a greater ability
               to contribute to the common good
           iv. consistent with the core of liberal philosophy, the idea of
                a general good capable of being shared by everyone and
                providing a standard for legislation
       4. Green's two elements of rights:
           i. claim to freedom of action in acquiring subsistence as
              part of an individual's impulse to realize his own inner
              powers and capabilities
           ii. general social recognition that this claim is warranted
               and that the individual's freedom really does contribute
               to the general good 

"A moral community from Green's point of view, therefore, is one in
 which the individual responsibly limits his claims to freedom in the
 light of general social interests and in which the community itself
 supports his claims because the general well-being can be realized
 only through his initiative and freedom." 732

 J. Green accepted the state as a positive agency to be used where
    legislation could contribute to positive freedom.
 K. Problems arose in dispute between two of Green's disciples,
     Bernard Bosanquet and  Leonard Hobhouse.
       1. Centered around two ethical relationships:
           i. between individual and community, and 
           ii. between society and state
       2. Bosanquet argued the more Hegelian view of a "social
           self" as what a person would be if fully moral and fully
           intelligent when not impeded by one-sided give-and-take
           with society in charge. 
       3. Hobhouse attacked metaphysical usage of the term "state,"
           introduced to English usage by idealists because it could be
           used to justify illiberal political regimentation or social
           stratification.
 L. Green was also compatible with liberal socialism such as the 
     Fabians.
       1. The Fabians seek to regulate the economy because of the
           bad effects of unregulated ones, not because of class
           struggle.
       2. Extended the critique of economic rent to the accumulation
           of capital.
 M. Liberalism has two usages now, both with valid historical
      background.
       1. As a midpoint between conservatism and socialism, 
           favorable to reform but opposed to radicalism. 
       2. As equivalent to what is popularly called democracy as
           opposed to communism and fascism.
           i. liberalism in this sense means the preservation of
              democratic institutions
           ii. can be identified with whole Western civilization while
               the first meaning can be identified with the middle class 
 N. In the aftermath of WWI, fascism and communism set up
     transcendent collective entity based on race, nation or community.
      1. Conflicted with core elements of liberalism: individualism
          and the moral nature of the relationships between individuals
          in a community.
      2. The moral nature of society inevitably came to be expressed
          as some version of natural rights.
       

Next week:  Marx and Dialectical Materialism            
      

Notes on "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 27

For episode 26, see here

The Theory of the Nation State: The Moderns

XXVII. Convention and Tradition -- Hume and Burke
 A. Natural Law hung on in France as revolutionary solvent of an antiquated
      system.
 B. In defense of revolution in England, natural law had no immediate 
     practical utility.
       1. Idea of deductive ethics and philosophy slowly rejected.
       2. Empirical philosophy stressing natural history of ideas and their
           derivation from the senses developed (as Locke suggested).
 C. David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, 1739-40)  
       1. Presented analysis that exposed pretensions of natural law to
           scientific validity.
       2. Use of reason had uncritically combined and confused three factors.
           i. Had effect of describing as necessary truths propositions that can
              make no such claim.
           ii. Can be things rightly called reasonable in the sense of being
               necessary and inevitable, e.g., formal implications where a
               conclusion follows if a premise is taken for granted--> deduction. (1)
           iii. No "comparison of ideas" can prove a matter of fact, and 
               relationships between matters of fact are never necessary in a strict
               sense but simply empirically correlated.(2)
           iv. Reason cannot dictate ways of acting, good or bad but can only
               guide us to know how to achieve desired ends and how to avoid 
               undesired ones.(3)

 Hume: "reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can
 never pretend to any other office than to save and obey them."

       3. The attacked the three branches of natural law system.
           i. Natural or rational religion -- a rational metaphysics showing the
              necessary existence of anything -- is impossible.
           ii. Rational ethics also since values depend on human propensity
               to action and reason cannot itself create any obligation. 
               Virtue is just a quality of mind that is generally approved. 
           iii. Contractual, consensual theories of politics also as government
                doesn't really ask subjects to consent. Loyalty towards
                government is as common as feeling that agreements should
                be kept; purposes of political allegiance is to keep order and
                preserve peace and security while contract creates mutual trust
                between private persons.  Both are binding because stable
                society is not possible without them.
       4. Hume didn't find man to be as calculating of his self interest as
           did Bentham and the French utilitarians.
       5. Common interest exists as body of conventions shown by experience
           to serve human needs in a general way.  Rules provide stability as
           men need to know what they can rely on:
           i. Conventions regulating property --> justice
           ii. Those that legitimate political authority 
           iii. Utility includes self interest and social stability
 D. Hume's conclusions largely accepted but branded as merely negative.
       1. Logical result was empirical positivism.
       2. Metaphysics, religion and ethics went on, however, in more or less
           traditional forms.
           i. Kant and Hegel attempted to reunite reason, fact and value
           ii. tendency to either depreciate logic as compared to sentiment or
               to hope to combine the two (Carlyle)
           iii. respect for sentiment led to new estimate of custom and tradition,
               as unfolding of reason rather than its antithesis (Burke)
           iv. view of history as gradual unfolding of the absolute 
 E. Edmund Burke accepted Hume and saw a society's standards as
      conventions based on propensities.
       1. Saw conventions as repository of achievements of the species.
       2. Saw society and propensities as human nature.
       3. Consequently, traditions of a nation's life have utility above their
           contribution to individual utility.
       4. Therefore, tradition of constitution, and of society at large, ought to be
           object of almost religious reverence.
       5. The species is wiser that the individual or any movement.
       6. Supported Whigs because the particular outcome of the English
           revolution they represented was by that time tradition. 
           i. Consequently, his theory of representation looked back to the
              17th Century
           ii. Denied representation being of individuals or territories
           iii. Parliament was meeting place of dominant interests where they
               could be held accountable
           iv. did, however, see positive benefits of parties as groups of men
               pursuing their natural interests upon some shared principle.
       7. A people was a "true politic personality" -- a community held together
           by sense of membership and duty and not calculated self interest.
       8. Man could not live on private stock of reason.
       9. Statesman consulted spirit of the constitution to gain clues for its
           development; statesmanship is an art. 
       10. Rejected French Revolution as destruction of society through
             destruction of government.
           i. For Sabine, Burke confused state, government and society by
              interchanging them.
           ii. Resulted in transferring reverence toward society to reverence
               to the state.
           iii. Practically made politics religion and saw unfolding immanence
               of God.
       11. Rousseau and Burke shared reverence for community.
       12. Hegel systematized Burke, though no direct link.

Next week: Hegel -- Dialectic and Nationalism




   
  

Notes on "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 26

For episode 25, see here

The Theory of the Nation State: The Moderns

XXVI. Jean Jacques Rousseau and Rediscovery of Community
 A. Great gap between Rousseau and his contemporaries.
 B. Was a deeply divided personality, noble vs base, ideal vs real.

     "More than most men, Rousseau projected the contradictions and maladjustments of his own nature upon the society about him and sought an anodyne for his own painful sensitivity. (Sabine, 577)"

 C. Used contrast between the natural and the actual not as appeal to reason 
      but to attack reason.
 D. Against intelligence, growth of knowledge and Enlightenment progress,
      he set amiable and benevolent sentiments, good will and reverence.

     "What gives value to life is the common emotions, perhaps one may say instincts, in respect to which men differ hardly at all and which he imagined to exist in a purer and less perverted form in the simple uneducated man than in the enlightened and sophisticated."

 E. Based his values on "realities" of everyday life.
 F. Intelligence and science are dangerous because they undermine 
     reverence and faith.
 G. Pulled philosophy away from union with science and implanted 
      distrust of intelligence.
 H. Rejected systematic individualism and self-interest as virtue.
 I.  Took from Plato a general outlook.
       1. Political subjection is essentially ethical and only secondarily a
           matter of law and power.
       2. Community itself is chief moralizing agent and represents the
           highest moral value.
       3. Therefore fundamental moral category is citizen not man.
 J. Saw rights not as against community but within it.
       1. Natural egoist is fiction, some kind of community is inevitable,
           society is purely instinctive.
       2. Community has corporate personality, a general will.
       3. Government is agent for this will (could be radical or conservative).
       4. General will is the source of law and morals.
 K. The General Will
       1. Saw city-state as the best example of venue for the general will.
       2. Contract useful device even though government has no
           independent power; citizens exist as members of society,
           individuals have no rights except as members of the community.
       3. General will is the collective good of the community which is not
           the same as the private interest of its members.
       4. Men become equal within a society not because (per Hobbes)
           their physical power is substantially equal.
       5. Absolute authority of general will vis-a-vis indefeasible individual
           rights.
       6. When one is forced to obey general will, one is being forced to
           be free because one doesn't know his own good.
 L. Rousseau originated romantic cult of the group contrary to rationalist's
      cult of the individual.  
 M. In adapting the model of citizenship within the city-state to modern
      modern nation-state, Rousseau helped to recast it in such a form
      that national sentiment could appropriate it.
 N. Rousseau's impact
       1. Idealizing moral feeling of the common man led to Kant
       2. Full significance of idealizing collective will and participation in the
           common led to the idealism of Hegel.
       3. Descartes split reason from custom, Rousseau tacitly set it aside,
           Hegel tried to reunite them.
       4. Burke supplied missing content to "general will" by giving
           corporate life of England (custom and tradition) a conscious reality.

Next week:  Convention and Tradition -- Hume and Burke










 
 


 
 




 

Notes on "A History of Political Theory" -- Episode 21

For episode 20, see here

The Theory of the Nation State

XXI. Thomas Hobbes
 A. Hobbes' political writings occasioned by civil war and were intended to
      support the King. 
 B. Sought to account on scientific grounds for all facts of nature including
      society and individuals (an approach now defined as materialism).
       1. Derived complex appearances from underlying simple motions.
       2. Used a geometry and physics to account for individual physiology
           and psychology and those to build a philosophy of the most complex
           "artificial" bodies, society and the state.
 C. That which was natural for Hobbes was not an end (e.g. natural law) but a
      cause (the psychological mechanism of the human animal).
       1. Resulting in societies made up of mutual actions and reactions of
           individuals upon each other.
       2. Not moral ideals but causes that will evoke generally cooperative
           behavior are conditions of a stable union.
 D. All emotions and desires derive from primitive attractions or retractions
      from stimulus.
 E. Rule behind all behavior is that a living body is set instinctively to preserve
      or heighten its vitality.
       1. Leads to restless pursuit of means to continue existence.
       2. Means that security is always precarious with result that there is no
           limit on the desire for security and power ("the present means of
           obtaining apparent future goods").
       3. This plus a rough equality in capabilities leads to a war of all against
           all -- with no "right" or "wrong" -- and thus making civilization
           impossible. 
 F. Reason is second principle of human nature.
       1. Makes pursuit of security more effective.
       2. Ruthless pursuit of individual advantage cannot be basis of society.
       3. Calculating selfishness brings man into society.
 G. Laws of nature state what ideally rational beings would do to achieve
      security. 
       1. This forms postulates upon which rational construction of society
           takes place.
       2. Laws amount to this:
           i. peace and economy have greater utility for self-preservation than
              violence and general competition
           ii. peace requires mutual confidence in the surrender of the "right to
               everything"
 H. Society is simply the means to an end.
       1. Based on utilitarianism and individualism.
       2. Such a notion of individualism was a clean break with customary 
           ideas about economic and social institutions.
       3. The defense of monarchy superficial next to this.
 I. To safeguard covenant by which all surrendered rights, a coercive
     power, i.e. government, was required. 
       1. Men do what they dislike on pain of suffering what they dislike even
           more.
       2. Cooperation is formed by union of individuals -- not consent from
           "citizens" -- which acts as, and through, one sovereign individual. 
 J. Law and morals are the same, simply the will of the sovereign.
 K. All necessary powers belong to the sovereign and are individual and 
      unalienable. 
       1. There is no justification for resistance.
       2. Yet if resistance is successful and the sovereign unable to govern
           (provide security), he is sovereign no longer.
       3. Monarchy not essential to the theory.
       4. Church is the only other corporation existing as an act of sovereign will.
 L. Advantages  of government are tangible and must accrue to individuals.
 M. Rests on no general or public good or will, only self-interested individuals. 

Next week: Radicals and Communists